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with the defendant." "" (b) "The plaintiff is precluded relief due to
his own credulousness or imprudence." 21
Similarly, where the woman represents herself as pregnant by a
man with whom she has had prenuptial intercourse, when in fact she
is not pregnant at all, the courts usually refuse any remedy,21 be-
cause, as the court said in Fairchild v. Fairchild,22 "they are equally
abominable and filthy in the eyes of the law." A clearer case would
be that in which the woman honestly believed she was pregnant, and
only after the marriage discovered she was not, for here there
would be not a question of fraudulent representation but only in-
nocent mistake. The court would probably refuse relief.
The principal case seems to be well decided because the plaintiff
has failed to overcome the presumption of legitimacy, and the fraud
was not sufficiently proved to satisfy the requirements of the statute.
J.R.C.
EQUITY
EQUITY-EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST POLICE INTERFER-
ENCE WITH BUSINESS
Plaintiff, stipulating that he is the owner of a restaurant in the
City of Warren, seeks to enjoin the defendants from stationing po-
lice officers in his place of business. The case was appealed on ques-
tions of law and fact to the Court of Appeals of Trumbull County
from the Court of Common Pleas of that county. During the year
of 1938, there were ten arrests and convictions for exhibiting gam-
bling paraphernalia in the plaintiff's restaurant. Officers were kept
in plaintiff's place of business from about Nov. 28, 1938, until Dec.
8, 1938, continuously from the time that the restaurant opened in the
morning until it closed in the evening. The plaintiff claims that his
property and civil rights have been invaded by the actions of the
defendants and that such an invasion constitutes a continuing tres-
pass for which the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. Plain-
1, Seilheimer v. Seilheimer, 40 N. 3. Eq. 412, 2 At. 376 (18S5); but cf. Winner v.
Winner, 171 Wise. 413, 177 N. V. 6S0 (1920).
"I Foss v. Foss, 12 Allen 26 (Mfass. 1866).
2 fHerr v. Herr, 109 Pa. Sup. 42, 165 At. 547 (1916); Bryant v. Bryant, 171 N. C.
746, 88 S. E. 147 (1916); Mason v. 'Mason, 164 Ark. 59, 261 S. W. 40 (1924); Donovan
v. Donovan, 263 N. Y. S. 336, 147 N. Y. Misc. 157 (1933); Santer v. Santer, 324 Pa.
140, 188 AtI. 531 (1936).
= 43 N. J. Eq. 473 at 477, 11 At!. 426 (1887).
LAW JOURNAL-MARCH, 1942
tiff prays that defendants be enjoined from stationing and maintain-
ing police officers in plaintiff's place of business. The court denied
plaintiff's prayer for an injunction.-
Historically, the development of equity in the field of torts has
been mainly in the protection of property rights in land.2  Since land
is something corporeal, the courts of equity were reluctant to assume
jurisdiction to protect those things which are incorporeal. There is
some authority to the effect that a person cannot secure an injunc-
tion to restrain interference with his 'business because a business is
not property and equity only takes jurisdiction where a property
right is involved. 3  However, the trend is to broaden the concept of
property right to the point that it is now considered to include a
business.4
The immediate problem is whether one owning a business may
secure an injunction restraining police interference with that busi-
ness. If an operator of gambling devices seeks to restrain police
activity directed toward the destruction of such gambling machines,
the courts will deny him relief because he can have no property
right for this purpose in such machines.5 The courts have also em-
ployed the "clean hands" maxim as a basis of denying equitable re-
lief to one who shows a willingness to conceal evidence as to the
legality of his business.6
The general rule, based on policy, is that equity will not inter-
fere with police officers in the discharge of their duties.7 The courts
of equity, however, will restrain police interference with the plain-
' Monfrino v. Gutelius, 66 Ohio App. 293, 33 N. E. (2d) 1003 (1941).
2 WALSH, EQUITY (1930) p. 213.
3 J. Holmes dissenting in the case of Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921) states,
"By calling a business 'property' you make it seem like land, and lead up to the
conclusion that a statute cannot cut down the advantages of ownership existing before
the statute. An established business no doubt may have pecuniary value and com-
monly is protected by law against various unjustified injuries. But yoll cannot give
it definiteness of contour by calling it a thing. It is a course of conduct."
Also see FREY, THE LABOR INJUNCTION pp. 33-34.
4 Featherstone v. Independent Service Station Ass'n of Texas et al., 10 S. V. (2d)
134 (1928); State v. Charles Stewart, 59 Vermont 273, 9 A. 559 (1887); Barr et al. v.
The Essex Trades Council, The Typographical Union No. 103, of Newark, et al., 53 N. J.
Eq. 101, 30 A. 881 (1894).
5Snyder v. City of Alliance, 41 Ohio App. 48, 179 N. E. 426 (1931). Concerning a
property right in the gambling device, the court on page 55 of the opinion ruled as fol-
lows:
"We therefore find it to be an evil chattel, and there is no property right therein
which this, a court of equity, recognizes or proposes to protect."
6 Adolph Hirsch v. Henry Hunt et al., 13 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 137 (1912).
'Pleasants v. Smith, 90 Miss. 440, 43 So. 475 (1907); Delaney v. Flood, 183 N. Y.
323, 76 N. E. 209, (1906).
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tiff's business if it is shown that the police officers have no official
duty to perform. Thus, the court in the case of the City of Louisville
v. Lougher- granted the plaintiff an injunction restraining police
officers from interfering with the plaintiff's speech which was not
objectionable for it was not made at such a meeting or dangerous
assemblage which the police had a duty to suppress. Also in the
case of Boring v. Hunt" the court issued an injunction against the
stationing of police officers in plaintiff's place of business because
the plaintiff was violating no criminal statute but only a civil usury
statute. In Ruty v. Huelenbeck,10 the court ruled that an injunc-
tion may be granted to enjoin interference with operation of business
by physical force on mere claim of violation of the criminal law.
The language of the court suggested that belief that the primary
purpose of the raids was to stop the dance and not to enforce the
criminal law.
Insufficiency of evidence of criminal conduct on the part of the
plaintiff is an element which may cause the court to issue an in-
junction against the police officers. In Burns v. McAdoo" the of-
ficers claimed that they were kept on the premises because such had
been previously used for gambling purposes. The court thought that
the evidence failed to show that the plaintiff or his employees were
connected with or visited the premises when it was used for gam-
bling purposes and for this reason the court concluded that the sta-
tioning of police officers on the premises was not warranted. On
the other hand, in the Ceary v. McAdoo case,"2 the court ruled that
since the usual paraphernalia of a poolroom was found on the plain-
tiff's premises, there was sufficient evidence of criminal conduct to
justify the stationing of police officers on and near the plaintiff's
premises in order to watch them. The court in the principal case
was on solid grounds with respect to the sufficiency of evidence as
to plaintiff's business for ten arrests had been made and the plaintiff
himself had pleaded guilty to interfering with a police officer in the
performance of his duty.
The reluctance of a court of equity to interfere with the enforce-
ment of the criminal law is explained on the grounds that a person
accused of crime and threatened with arrest could appeal to a court
8 City of Louisville et al. v. Lougher, 209 Ky. 299, 272 S. W. 748 (1925).
"Boring v. Hunt ai al., 22 Ohio Dec. N. P. 543 (1912).
"Ruty ai al. v. HucIssnheeck, County Sheriff. 109 N. J. Eq. 273, 156 A. 922 (1931).
1 Burns v. McAdoo, 113 App. Div. 165 (1906).
2 Ckary v. McAdow, 113 App. Div. 178 (1906).
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of equity and by pleading that his property rights were about to be
interfered with he would be able to thwart criminal justice.13 This
reason should not be allowed to permit unwarranted police inter-
ference with one's business.
It is submitted that the best way for a court of equity to approach
this problem, granting that jurisdiction exists, is to look at the cir-
cumstances of the. individual case. It may consider the plaintiff's
conduct 'bad and refuse to take jurisdiction on the "clean hands"
maxim. It must, in any event, decide whether the officers are per-
forming official duties in a lawful manner and also whether the evi-
dence as to the illegality of the plaintiff's business is sufficient to
justify police interference. Equity must be controlled, however, by
broad principles of policy and must exercise considerable caution
whenever its decree will interfere with the enforcement of the crim-
inal law.
R L. R.
REAL PROPERTY
DEEDS - FEE SIMPLE DETERMINABLE - NECESSITY FOR
WORDS OF INHERITANCE IN REVERTER CLAUSE.
Defendants in an action to quiet title claimed a reversionary
interest as heirs of a grantor under an 1849 deed. The deed pro-
vided: ". . . The above tract is granted to ... trustees of aforesaid
New -Church Society . . . and their heirs forever, to be held by them
in trust forever . . . Now the conditions of this grant . . . is that
the above named meeting house is to be used for New Church pur-
poses. Provided that should it ever cease to be used for said purposes
that then the land is to return to its original owners."
The court rejected the defendant's claim of a reversionary in-
terest and held that the grant created a fee simple absolute. It said
that the reverter clause was not of sufficient force to make the
grantee's estate a determinable fee in the absence of words of in-
heritance used with the reversionary interest. First New Jerusalem
Church v. Singer, 68 Ohio App., 119 (I942).
The primary rule in construing conveyances is to effectuate the
intention of the grantor,2 and no special words are essential to create
13 Snyder v. Swope, Director of Safety, 23 Ohio L. R. 361, 366 (1922).
" For authority contra, see cases discussed in article, Reversionary Restrictions, (1940)
U. CIN. L. REv. 524, 526-532, which are contra by implication.
2 13 0. JuR. 891; see Post v. Weil, 115 N. Y. 361 (1889).
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